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Abstract 
This chapter explores labour outcomes and dynamics for Chinese FDI and infrastructure 
contractors through their encounters with workers, states, and labour institutions in Africa. 
The chapter critically assesses the most popular claims about job creation and working 
conditions in Chinese firms in Africa and offers an alternative and more empirically nuanced 
view of the employment realities and dynamics in construction and industrial Chinese firms 
across Africa. The chapter questions claims of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ in labour relations, 
and proposes a labour regime analysis to grasp the power of global capitalist forces, national 
political economy, and micro-level workplace processes to better understand labour 
relations in China as well as in Africa, in the sectors where Chinese firms are particularly 
present. This framework is deployed to illustrate the variation, diversity, and changes in 
labour regimes in China and among Chinese firms in Africa, and the key factors that drive 
such variations.  
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Introduction: workplace encounters and economic transformations

 
A Chinese foreman wearing a large straw hat in the scorching sun gives instructions to a 
group of five Angolan workers giving the finishing touches to a pavement on a new road in 
Angola. Another group of workers surrounds a Chinese employee in blue uniform, who is 
handing out payslips for signature, which workers take to a tin shed at the end of the building 
site. Nearby an Angolan worker is operating a large motor grader sitting alongside a Chinese 
operator who monitors every single movement with an intense look.  Further away, in 
Ethiopia, a Chinese factory manager walks around a couple of production lines shouting 
orders to an Ethiopian line supervisor while dozens of young women are busy stitching parts 
into a model for trousers. One of the lines is lagging behind and disrupting the workflow for 
other lines. Another Chinese supervisor summons a group of workers to quickly move to the 
refectory for the lunch break, uttering a few basic words in Amharic while using hand-to-
mouth signs.  
These workplace encounters are becoming increasingly common in many African countries. 
Images of Chinese and African workers together in construction sites and factories have 
become an important area of interest in much of the reporting on China–Africa encounters. 
What these images have in common is the emergence of new jobs in non-primary sectors at a 
time when debates on the imperative of structural transformation in Africa are raging. The 
opportunities arising from the investments and projects of Chinese and many other Asian 
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enterprises in the manufacturing and construction sectors in many parts of Africa are highly 
visible even if official statistics still depict an image of agrarian-based economies. 
Chinese FDI to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA henceforth) has grown substantially since the early 
2000s (see Chapter 1). A large proportion of these investments are from medium-sized 
enterprises in the manufacturing and services sectors, often oriented towards domestic 
markets (McKinsey, 2017; Shen, 2015; see also Chapter 15). Meanwhile, the presence of 
Chinese construction companies has boomed in Africa during the same period at an even 
more impressive pace. The construction boom in Africa, both for residential and 
infrastructure investments, has attracted a large number of Chinese contractors, mostly SOEs. 
As a result, SSA is the second most important overseas market for Chinese construction 
firms, with US$ 40.6 billion (Wolf and Cheng, 2018). By 2017 Chinese contractors 
accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the African construction market for the top 250 
international contractors (ENR, 2018). In fact, the value of Chinese construction projects and 
contract revenues far exceeds the flows (and even stocks) of Chinese FDI to the African 
continent, reaching almost US$45 billion compared with just over US$30 billion of FDI 
stocks by 2015 (Wolf and Cheng, 2018). 
While there are different labour intensities associated with different sub-sectors and types of 
construction, there is no doubt that the expansion of industrial investments and construction 
projects has created a huge number of non-agricultural jobs across African economies. Thus 
increasing numbers of Chinese firms, as well as companies originating elsewhere, especially 
the Middle East and Asia, are gradually contributing to the process of building an industrial 
labour force in Africa (Oya, 2019). Yet, much of the journalistic reporting focuses on the 
presence of Chinese workers throughout the continent. There is also much talk about sub-
standard working conditions and whether China is exporting poor labour practices (Shelton 
and Kabemba, 2012; Baah and Jauch, 2009).  
This chapter has the following objectives. First, it critically engages with popular claims 
about job creation, working conditions, and skill development in Chinese companies across 
Africa and offers an alternative more empirically nuanced view of these realities. Second, it 
proposes a labour regime analytical framework, and different research questions, to 
understand the interaction of global, national, and local forces in the determination of labour 
outcomes, to question the often assumed Chinese ‗exceptionalism‘ in labour relations, and to 
better understand workplace relations in Africa in the sectors where Chinese firms are 
particularly present. Third, it illustrates through emerging case-study research how different 
labour practices arise in different countries and sectors, underscoring the importance of sector 
and context specificity, management practices, and local (African) agency in determining 
labour outcomes.   
China–Africa labour encounters: dominant and emerging questions 
and debates 
There is a growing number of studies and journalistic material reporting on the employment 
effects of Chinese firms in Africa. While China is seen as a popular partner, primarily 
because of its contribution to infrastructure development,
1
 Chinese employers do not enjoy 
the same popularity (Sun, 2017). Although the literature on labour effects of Chinese firms in 
Africa is still in its infancy, there are three types of common claims and perceptions that are 
often found in media reports, some academic publications, and indeed when interviewing 
different kinds of respondents in business and government settings. First is the claim that 
Chinese firms mostly or often employ large numbers of Chinese workers in positions that 
should be filled by African workers. Second, it is often reported that working conditions are 
sub-standard and exploitative in Chinese firms in Africa. Third, the limited localization is 
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compounded by very limited efforts to develop the skills of local workers. We will discuss 
each of these claims in turn and compare with the best available evidence. 
Workforce localization: do Chinese firms rely on Chinese labour? 
On the issue of job creation and localization, a common perception is the reliance on Chinese 
labour and the limited hiring of local labour (French, 2014). At one extreme of this 
widespread narrative are ludicrous stories that have survived over time about the issue of 
Chinese prison labour in Chinese construction sites in Africa.
2
 Yet, this kind of story 
continues to be reproduced by journalists and even researchers (see Sautman and Yan, 2016, 
for some examples). This perception is now fortunately more widely questioned thanks to the 
growing availability of evidence to the contrary,
3
 even if such claims persist among 
uninformed commentators, firm managers, journalists, and even some African government 
officials, as we encountered in our own research in Angola and Ethiopia in 2016–17. 
More reliable statistics on Chinese workers in Africa, as compiled by SAIS-CARI, show a 
marked increase between 2001 (nearly 47,000 workers) and 2016 (227,000 workers) with a 
peak of over 263,000 in 2015. Of these, the proportion of Chinese workers in SSA countries 
has been steadily declining from a peak of 78 per cent in 2011 to only 58 per cent in 2016, so 
that North Africa has a disproportionate share of Chinese workers and lower levels of 
localization.  In absolute terms, after years of growth, the number of Chinese workers in SSA 
declined by nearly 20 per cent, a sign that workforce localization has been gaining force both 
in absolute and relative terms.
4
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There are already a number of large studies and plenty of specific case-study evidence 
suggesting that levels of workforce localization (as proportions of African workers in Chinese 
firms in Africa) are high and have been increasing across several countries in the past ten 
years. The most recent and comprehensive source of evidence on workforce localization is 
the survey of over 1,000 Chinese firms in eight countries conducted by McKinsey (2017). 
This report shows how these firms largely rely on local labour, despite some significant 
variation by project and sector. The average rate of localization is 89 per cent. Sector matters 
and in manufacturing this proportion reaches 95 per cent (McKinsey, 2017: 41). This is 
consistent with another large-scale compilation of more than 400 firms/projects from several 
hundred interviews and thousands of documents (Sautman and Yan, 2015), which concludes 
that the average localization rate is 85 per cent, with most firms clustered within the 80–95 
per cent band largely depending on sectors. In our own project, we compiled nearly 60 
studies/cases covering the wide spectrum of projects from very low to very high levels of 
localization and a weighted average of 85 per cent (see Table A1 for an illustrative selection 
of these sources).
5
 About two-thirds of these cases/studies had localization rates exceeding 80 
per cent. Moreover, comparisons between firms of different (foreign) nationality are rare but 
Rounds and Huang (2017) provide unusual evidence of roughly similar rates of localization 
between Chinese and American firms in Kenya (78 and 82 per cent respectively). More 
comparisons would surely show that the proportion of ‗expat‘ labour in other foreign firms is 
not negligible, but such comparative evidence is generally missing.
6
 
Claims of widespread use of Chinese workers contrast with significant differences in 
workforce localization rates, with certain countries like Angola or Equatorial Guinea 
receiving more Chinese labour in absolute and relative terms compared to other countries 
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 For example, according to our own interviews, three well-established Angolan road contractors employed 5, 
20, and 30 per cent of expat labour in 2016 respectively, with differences being partly related to the relative 
scarcity of projects during that period.  
where the presence of Chinese expat labour is more limited (see Table A1 in Appendix for 
examples of variation). Moreover, SAIS-CARI databases on Chinese workers in Africa show 
a stable pattern between 2009 and 2016, when the recorded number was just over 200,000 
workers. Given the rapid increase in Chinese FDI and construction projects (Wolf and Cheng, 
2018), and assuming a similar rate of growth in job creation, most of the expansion in 
employment during that period must have gone to African workers. Cheru and Oqubay (see 
Chapter 15) show that Chinese FDI has created many more thousands of jobs (nearly 40,000 
between 2000 and 2016) than other foreign companies. This dominance in absolute number 
of jobs created is compatible with the use of some Chinese labour for strategically critical 
positions. Especially in the early period of expansion of construction projects and FDI 
Chinese firms saw advantages in using Chinese workers for management, engineering, and 
skilled positions as they were more familiar with ―companies‘ organization and process‖, 
quicker for the process of installing new equipment imported from China, and to make sure 
the first projects with some political significance were completed in very short timeframes, 
compared to competitors (Tang, 2016: 110).  
Variation in rates of localization and job creation for African workers is linked to several 
factors. First, variation across countries may be due to differences in the requirements set out 
by host countries with regard to the type of expat labour that can be imported into the country 
as well as to the structural deficits in technical/skilled labour (Sautman and Yan, 2015). 
Countries like Angola or Equatorial Guinea are more affected by skill shortages in the labour 
market than other countries like South Africa, Ghana, or Kenya. Some countries (e.g., 
Ethiopia) have strict visa policies and only very limited categories of workers were allowed 
to obtain work visas, suggesting this is an important policy tool that can determine the rate of 
localization by imposition. Second, ownership (private or state) seems to have mixed effects. 
Our own analysis of several cases/studies of construction projects suggests that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) tend to have higher percentages of local workforce, partly due to more 
compliance with legal requirements when these are set by host countries, partly because of 
the costs of hiring Chinese labour in SOEs. However, the McKinsey report (2017) finds the 
opposite for their sample of firms across different sectors, where private firms tend to rely 
more on local labour (92 per cent) than SOEs (81 per cent). The main reason for this is the 
dominance in their sample of private firms operating in manufacturing and services, where 
localization rates are higher since skill demands may be lower than in many infrastructure 
projects that also suffer from the imperative of timely project completion. In other words, 
sector matters and the specific technology used by a firm also shapes the need for expat 
labour in foreign firms. Third, the type of project also matters: we observed in Angola that in 
flagship infrastructure projects with demanding technical standards firms had no option but to 
bring in specialized experienced workers in order to meet the tight time schedule and the 
quality expectations of the client (i.e., the Angolan authorities). Fourth, the longer Chinese 
companies operate in a country, the more settled they are, the more they rely on local workers 
(Tang, 2016; Lam, 2014; Sautman and Yan, 2015; Corkin, 2011). There are different forces 
at play in this case. On the one hand, as Chinese firms settle in new markets and gradually 
build a core local labour force, their recruitment processes adapt to the new context and the 
skills developed among local workers pay off after an initial transitional period. On the other 
hand, since the early 2000s, the rapid growth in labour costs in China has meant that Chinese 
workers have become increasingly expensive and less affordable for companies operating 
overseas, even for large SOEs. Economic crisis and foreign exchange shortages may also 
force firms to reduce their expat labour force given the difficulties of paying in foreign 
currency.
7
 In any case, the evidence reviewed here shows that the contribution to the mass 
creation of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs for African workers is beyond doubt, and the 
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implications for processes of structural transformation are significant since many of these 
jobs contribute to the gradual building of an industrial labour force in Africa. 
Working conditions  
Evidence on working conditions is also patchy and largely anecdotal. Most available 
empirical studies suggest that Chinese firms comply with national minimum wage legislation 
but in some cases offer lower wages than their competitors in the same sector. This does not 
mean wages lower than national or sector averages, just that pay may be lower than other 
firms in the same sub-sectors. However, overall the evidence is not conclusive and lacks 
comparative quantitative rigour (Oya et al., 2018). 
Tang (2016) provides various examples where reported wages were ‗low‘ in relation to the 
‗national average‘ or other foreign firms.
8
 Baah and Jauch (2009) also conclude that Chinese 
firms in Angola, Ghana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia tended to pay the lowest wages 
when compared to local and other foreign firms. A much-debated HRW report on Zambian 
mines (2011) emphasized that Chinese-owned copper mines offered the lowest salaries 
compared to other OECD-owned mines despite paying above the national minimum wage, 
but these comparisons have been criticized for lack of empirical rigour (Sautman and Yan, 
2016; Lee, 2017). There are also examples where wages are not as low as expected. A very 
recent survey in the Eastern Industrial Zone in Ethiopia suggests that average wages among 
Chinese factories in the zone are considered ‗low‘ by workers but they are well above a 
reported national average in the formal sector (Fei, 2018). In a 2012 World Bank survey of 
firms in Ethiopia, median wages in Chinese firms were 60 per cent higher than in domestic 
firms (Bashir, 2015: 8). At GUMCO, a Chinese ceramic manufacturer in Ghana, wages of 
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Ghanaian workers (ranging between US$2.2 and US$10 per day) were both above the 
national minimum wage of US$1.9 per day (as of 2008) and also above the Indian 
comparator plant offering US$1.9 per day (Akorsu and Cooke, 2011). 
Beyond wages, evidence is more abundant on harsh working conditions in terms of long 
working hours, lack of written contracts, resistance to unionization, and more frequent 
breaches of labour regulations compared to other foreign companies (McKinsey, 2017; 
Rounds and Huang, 2017). Labour conflicts seem more frequent in Chinese-owned firms, but 
this may reflect the greater attention that these firms have received compared to companies of 
other nationalities and especially domestic ones (Rounds and Huang, 2017; Sautman and 
Yan, 2016). More conflictual relations have also been blamed on perceived resistance by 
Chinese employers to the presence of unions and communication barriers (Sautman and Yan, 
2016; Tang, 2016). Various studies have however shown that Chinese private firms may start 
operations with relatively unfavourable non-wage conditions but can gradually and 
sometimes quickly adapt and meet demands from collectively organized workers or from the 
host states (Lee, 2017; Tang, 2016). Our own research in Ethiopia and Angola also seems to 
point to wide variation in comparative wages among Chinese firms, depending on sector, 
firm size, market structures, and management behaviour. Where wages are lower than 
comparators, there are different reasons, such as low initial profitability after important 
capital investments (mines in Zambia), tighter profit margins for small-medium firms subject 
to fierce global competition, or reliance on more labour-intensive methods (Tang, 2016). In 
contrast, other firms opt to pay wage premia and out-compete other players in the sector to 
attract higher-quality workers as observed in Ethiopia‘s industrial zones. The relative strength 
of labour institutions, especially unions, also contributes to wage equalization among foreign 
firms in the same sectors, as in South Africa (Huang and Ren, 2013). 
These findings should also be put in perspective and understood within the wider context of 
labour market deregulation and privatization following structural adjustment reforms. All 
African countries, after decades of structural adjustment and waves of liberalization and 
privatization, have experienced a systematic weakening of labour institutions and mass 
informalization and casualization of labour (Lee, 2017; Meagher, 2016). The majority of 
Chinese firms have entered African markets at the peak of neoliberal hegemony on the 
continent. Conditions found in Zambian mines, for example, are more strongly linked to the 
crisis and reforms in the sector in the 1990s than to the nationality of foreign firms (Lee, 
2017).  
Skill development 
Sometimes low wages in early processes of industrialization are compensated for by the 
prospect of acquiring new skills and more stable jobs (Fei, 2018). Hence skill development is 
seen as one of the potential contributions from new Chinese investors especially in 
manufacturing. While construction projects provide some form of short-term transferable 
capabilities, factories have the advantage of contributing with long-term capability 
development. However, there are some claims that Chinese firms make a very limited 
contribution to skill development (Baah and Jauch, 2009). More recent survey work suggests 
that training is provided but workers arrive with higher expectations and find that training 
provision is not enough, although those working for globally integrated firms certainly 
receive substantial and more frequent training. The literature almost unanimously confirms 
that, contrary to popular belief, Chinese firms do engage in labour training (e.g., Bashir, 
2015; Shen, 2015; Corkin, 2011; Tang, 2016; Rounds and Huang, 2017; Lam, 2014). The 
McKinsey report (2017) confirms that nearly two-thirds of over 1,000 surveyed Chinese 
firms engage in training of local employees (43 per cent in the form of apprenticeship) but in 
construction and manufacturing, where skills are particularly important for African workers, 
73 per cent of firms offer training/apprenticeship.  
Variation among Chinese firms is important and useful policy lessons can be extracted from 
these differences. First, some sectors/industries tend to be more skill intensive and necessarily 
engage in more training, whereas basic assembly jobs in light manufacturing produce a more 
limited range of skill transfer (Chen et al., 2016). Second, larger and more globally integrated 
firms have fairly sophisticated training systems, including combinations of local training 
centres, periods of intensive learning and skill development in China (especially for 
managers, skilled personnel, and semi-skilled workers), and continuous on-the-job training 
with career development attached (Tang, 2016; Sun, 2017).
9
 Third, getting serious about 
building local skills and capabilities is also a way of meeting expectations from host states, 
which are important for the accumulation logic of many Chinese SOEs (Lee, 2017). Fourth, 
in some countries the state (through investment agencies and labour institutions) and lead 
firms in global production networks (GPNs) can put pressure on suppliers to boost skill 
formation in host countries and potentially contribute to the gradual development of skill 
development ‗systems‘ associated with priority sectors.  
One important reason why firms feel compelled to train their new workers is dissatisfaction 
with existing technical and vocational training systems in host countries, which makes 
managers prefer to ―hire someone off the street who‘s a blank slate‖ and directly invest in the 
most relevant skills for the company (McKinsey, 2017: 40). This is a strategy that is common 
to many other foreign investors, especially in export-oriented factories. Indeed job experience 
is the most effective form of training in the long-term process of industrial development 
(Amsden, 2001). Gerschenkron (1962) recognized long ago that the availability of cheap 
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scholarships, professional courses, infrastructure investments, and various forms of partnership (Bashir, 2015). 
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labour in latecomers was no guarantee of rapid industrialization, because in most agrarian-
based economies the kind of labour force that suits the demands of industrial factory work 
(time management, discipline, effort, reliability, etc.) is actually very scarce (see also Oya, 
2019). Thus, besides the existence or not of formal training programmes, these experiences 
suggest that hundreds of thousands of African workers who are often migrants finding entry-
level non-agricultural jobs are learning the basic skills of the occupations that are likely to 
grow in the next decades, thereby making a contribution to the prospects of further structural 
transformation. 
Summary 
This section has taken stock of the published evidence on labour outcomes in Chinese 
enterprises in Africa. The literature on labour issues and outcomes within the broad ‗China in 
Africa‘ field is still in its early days. Much more empirically grounded analysis is needed. 
Many of the debates and claims that have dominated the headlines in the intersection of 
media representation and some academic research lack analytical basis and empirical 
foundations. While an emerging body of ethnographic and qualitative research has helped 
debunk some myths, there is still a lack of rigorous quantitative evidence. Indeed, in our 
survey of the literature we have not found any large-scale quantitative survey of working 
conditions from the perspective of labour (i.e., workers‘ surveys rather than self-reported data 
from company management).
10
 More alarming is the scarcity of comparative evidence, which 
is needed to overcome biases that reinforce ideas of Chinese ‗exceptionalism‘. Indeed, an 
important problem with the way labour issues (and many other aspects) in the ‗China in 
Africa‘ field have been analyzed is the ‗methodological nationalism‘ which assumes intrinsic 
characteristics that apply to all sorts of Chinese actors in Africa. Thus, more quantitative and 
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qualitative comparative evidence on different kinds of Chinese and non-Chinese firms is 
sorely needed. 
Overcoming ‗Chinese exceptionalism‘ requires a different set of questions.  Is there one 
Chinese ‗labour regime‘? Is it different from labour regimes in developed or developing 
countries? If so, when firms travel overseas, do they travel with their labour practices? If not, 
what determines variation in labour outcomes among different firms in African countries? 
Whether or not working conditions in Chinese-owned enterprises in Africa are worse than 
relevant comparators, or mixed according to which sector or type of firm, a more important 
question is why. There is emerging research that seeks to tackle these questions, as we shall 
see. Before we extract key insights from such studies, we next consider the complexity of 
factors shaping the labour implications of Chinese investments and projects in Africa, and 
contextualize the modus operandi of Chinese firms by considering the different labour 
regimes found in China and some of China‘s labour market shifts in the past three decades. 
Understanding labour regimes in China 
Labour regimes and capitalism 
In order to understand labour outcomes (as working conditions and standards), several 
relevant factors must be considered. Different levels of analysis, from more abstract to more 
concrete, from the global to the local, are necessary to make sense of the multiple aspects that 
affect the conditions workers face in particular workplaces. The notion of ‗labour regime‘ is 
useful as a conceptual tool to explore interconnections between multiple factors and the 
differences between practices in different sectors and workplaces. Bernstein (2010: 125) 
defines a labour regime as ―the different methods of recruiting labour and their connections 
with how labour is organized in production (labour process) and how it secures its 
subsistence‖. Labour process theory is useful to understand the workplace dynamics and 
antagonistic interests of capital and labour, the former driven by the logic of accumulation to 
control and extract as much labour as possible from workers, and the latter resisting such 
pressures. Bernstein‘s definition, however, implies an extension of the analysis to understand 
how labour is mobilized to become available beyond the workplace, as well as how it is 
reproduced in a capitalist labour market. This analytical extension is exemplified by 
Burawoy‘s notion of the ―factory regime‖ (Burawoy, 1985), encompassing labour relations in 
production in conjunction with relations of production more broadly, by connecting the micro 
of the workplace with the macro politics of capital–labour relations in a national or global 
context.
11
 Lerche et al. (2017) add the relation between productive and reproductive realms to 
the concept of labour regime.
12
 As Selwyn (2016) notes, labour regime analysis is 
―necessarily multi-scalar‖, incorporating the global, national, regional, and local. The 
analytical extension also combines relations of production (and the capital–labour conflict) 
with relations to the market (i.e., commodification, especially of labour, land, and money) 
(Burawoy, 2013). These two relational processes in capitalism reflect both class struggle in 
the Marxian sense, and the movements and counter-movements in the Polanyi sense, or, as 
Selwyn (2014: 1020) puts it, ―Marx-type and Polanyi-type struggles (offensive and defensive 
struggles)‖. 
Drawing from this analytical framework, it is possible to operate at three different and 
interconnected levels of analysis to explain the multiple determinants of labour outcomes in a 
given context (see Figure 13.1). First, starting at the bottom, are the micro workplace 
dynamics and ‗raw‘ encounters between employers and workers over wages, productivity 
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imperatives, safety, effort, and labour time. Second are the characteristics and dynamics of a 
particular sector or global production network, which cuts across national boundaries and 
generates specific imperatives of labour control and standards, through market structures, 
competition, global chain rules, and technology, and which are intimately linked with skill 
requirements, spatial dimensions of labour processes, and even prevailing work culture and 
management ethos. Third is the national political economy, and particularly the 
macroeconomic dynamics shaping economic transformations and structural change alongside 
the macro politics of production and state–society relations which shape labour supply 
dynamics and the arenas of different struggles, whether over the extent of commodification, 
the limits to labour reproduction, or claims over representation. In this case, the relations 
between state, capital, and labour and the institutions that underpin these relations are critical 
to understand labour outcomes. Through such analytical lens, it is possible to explore the 
combination of a wide range of factors in determining labour standards for a particular firm 
and sector. 
Figure 13.1 Levels of labour regime analytical framework 
 
Source: Author‘s elaboration. 
 
Labour regimes in China: variation and shifts 
This framework helps us overcome the trap of ‗methodological nationalism‘ and ‗Chinese 
exceptionalism‘ if we consider the potential variety of labour regimes in China. Empirical 
research on labour relations in China originates from an array of disciplines from economics 
and industrial sociology to economic geography and political economy (Lüthje et al., 2013; 
Lee, 2009; Lerche et al., 2017). However, there is no consensus around the dominance of a 
particular labour regime, even though much of the literature has documented the extent to 
which labour control and repression have facilitated accelerated accumulation and 
transformations in China. Most studies articulate competing taxonomies of labour/production 
regimes with varying consequences in terms of labour standards and their evolution over 
time. Lüthje et al. (2013) consider up to five production regimes in the manufacturing sector 
only, with varying implications for labour standards: from those characterized by more stable 
employment, greater skill requirements and higher wages (e.g. in state-bureaucratic sector 
and TNCs-JVs in petrochemicals, automobile, steel) to ‗low-wage‘ flexible labour regimes 
encompassing more or less globally integrated production, strong labour segmentation, 
reliance on migrant workers, and poor working conditions, mainly in low-technology light 
manufacturing. Construction labour regimes, driven by the project nature of work in this 
sector, share such characteristics of strong labour segmentation and flexible insecure 
employment. In construction, a dominant pattern is the dominant presence of footloose 
migrant workers employed through complex subcontracting chains that makes them prey to 
the discretion of labour brokers/gangmasters and widespread informalization of labour 
relations (Swider, 2015). A dualism between more stable secure labour relations on the one 
hand and flexible, insecure, and informalized relations on the other hand straddles both the 
state–private ownership divide and sector boundaries, even if some regimes are more 
dominant in some sectors (Lüthje et al., 2013). This segmentation and flexibilization has 
arguably contributed to the empowerment of employers vis-à-vis workers, especially in those 
sectors characterized by flexible employment and reliance on migrant workers. In this regard, 
a particularity of China‘s labour regimes is the role of the hukou (household residential) 
system, which kept the umbilical cord between urban migrant workers and their rural 
households, thereby facilitating low-wage regimes (Lee, 1999; Lerche et al., 2017). 
However, these snapshot descriptions of prevailing labour regimes in China mask two 
additional types of variations within each sectoral labour regime. First are cross-sectional 
variations based on market structures (and degree of sector/internal competition), whether 
firms are export or domestic-market oriented, as well as on type of ownership, and especially 
the three leading categories in China: SOEs, JVs with TNCs, and domestic private firms. 
Second, longitudinal variations led by the rapid economic transformations and series of 
reforms that have gradually reconfigured the political economy of production and labour 
relations since the 1980s. It is worth noting, in particular, the role of corporatization of the 
SOE sector, and the concomitant growth in the private sector, which generally strengthened 
the authority of managers and weakened workers‘ bargaining power in the 1990s, leading to 
the emergence of a labour regime of ―disorganized despotism‖, different from the neo-
traditional regime of ―organized dependence‖ attributed to the pre-reform SOEs or to SOEs 
with monopoly power (Lee, 1999). Particularly in the sectors pertaining to the flexible mass 
production and ―low wage classic‖ regimes (e.g., textile and garment, toys, and other 
consumer goods) employer interests were well organized and coordinated, and their influence 
on local implementation of labour policies and exemptions has been noticeable (Lüthje et al., 
2013). The fragmentation of the working class into multiple administratively and 
contractually defined categories reinforced the empowerment of capital, especially in the 
1990s and early 2000s (Pringle, 2017). The rapid influx of FDI to China‘s ‗sunbelt‘ and the 
incorporation into global production networks operating with a logic of flexible accumulation 
and subject to fierce competition between ‗capitals‘ sourcing from different parts of the 
world, also generated pressures towards labour segmentation and flexible just-in-time (JIT) 
employment practices (Lerche et al., 2017). In the most exploitative labour regimes (garment 
and construction), characterized by the increasing role of labour intermediaries, there is a 
―triple absence‖: (1) the absence of recognized labour relations and recognized employers 
(because of the role of intermediaries); (2) the absence of the right to organize (resistance to 
unionization); and (3) the absence of rights other than those directly related to labour 
relations (ibid.). In sum, during the 1980s and 1990s, both national-level political economic 
dynamics and the penetration of highly dynamic and flexible GPNs produced the conditions 
for the emergence of labour regimes with weak workers‘ bargaining power, leading to 
‗despotic‘ workplace relations.   
At this point, two caveats are fundamental. First, as stated above, the most exploitative labour 
regimes coexist with other regimes where labour outcomes were different and better, 
reflecting legacies of the neo-traditional regime of ―organized dependence‖ (Lee, 1999). 
Second, the conditions observed in the export-oriented industrial ‗sunbelt‘ of coastal China or 
in its booming construction sector are similar and not necessarily worse than what is observed 
in other parts of Asia (Lerche et al., 2017) and generally in the developing world, lending 
credence to the fallacy of Chinese exceptionalism (Chan, 2015).  
Chinese exceptionalism in labour relations can also be questioned on the grounds of 
dynamics of change in the past three decades, and especially trends in the past fifteen years, 
which make us doubt that Chinese workers are mostly powerless vis-à-vis the more 
exploitative labour regimes. Silver‘s work (2003) on historical tendencies in labour resistance 
and mobilization shows that capitalism‘s technological fixes, such as flexible sourcing, 
automation, and other innovations may partly weaken labour‘s bargaining power in some 
places but ultimately provoke new instances of potential resistance and enhanced bargaining 
power. This has happened in China in recent times. Real wages of urban workers, including 
migrant workers, have grown substantially between 2000 and 2016—five-fold in the case of 
real urban wage rates and four-fold for migrant workers, an unprecedented change in China‘s 
contemporary history (Lo, 2018).   
Labour ‗striking back‘, if this is what rapidly rising wages mean, is linked to a range of 
competing explanations. First, JIT systems in globally integrated production networks and 
industrial upgrading (as experienced in Guangdong) increase the vulnerability of capital to 
workplace disruption at key nodes of the chain (Silver, 2003; Pringle, 2017). These shifts 
may empower certain worker segments, in transport and communications sectors, while other 
segments remain stuck in low gear, so the outcomes are uneven (hotels, retail, restaurant and 
other seasonal service workers).
 
Second, state intervention, especially through new labour 
legislation enacted in 2008 and 2013 and its relatively enhanced enforcement, have 
strengthened a set of new ‗hard rules‘, with an important role for minimum wages and moves 
towards reducing segmentation and insecure employment (Lüthje et al., 2013; Chan, 2015). 
Third, despite a rather weak official union system, labour militancy and Marx-type 
‗offensive‘ struggles seem on the rise, often on issues of closures and compensation (Pringle, 
2017). Fourth, demographic change, population ageing and the gradual exhaustion of the vast 
pool of rural young labour may explain emerging evidence of labour shortages and a ―Lewis 
turning point‖, which may have strengthened industrial workers‘ bargaining power (Yao, 
2014). It is difficult to establish which of these factors is more important, not least because 
they are all interrelated, especially the increasingly ‗pro-labour‘ state interventions since 2008 
and growing labour conflict, both feeding one another.  
It is in this context that the ‗flying geese‘ hypothesis has been revived in connection with the 
potential relocation of Chinese supply chains overseas, and particularly to Africa (see 
Chapter 14). The rise of industrial GPNs and its associated FDI dynamics since the 1980s 
have engendered a global pattern whereby, wherever capital (automobile, garment, 
electronics) moves to, new labour–capital conflict arises, and when that happens and 
threatens profits, capitalists resort to technological (automation) and/or spatial fixes (Silver, 
2003: 81). Thus the overview of labour regime features and their changes over time in China 
provides some important lessons to understand (a) the drivers of investments towards 
Africa—what new ‗spatial fixes‘ GPNs and Chinese firms will generate—and (b) what kinds 
of labour regimes will be associated with these investments in the new host countries. 
Whether Chinese capital flowing to Africa produces a new wave of ‗race to the bottom‘ is a 
matter of empirical investigation that is still scarce on Africa, as shown in the previous 
section, and will not in any case manifest any kind of ‗exceptionalism‘, given common global 
patterns. Some illustrations of the diversity of new Chinese labour regimes in SSA and the 
importance of context follow in the next section.   
Capital–labour relations from the African ground: illustrations from 
case studies 
Understanding labour relations in Chinese firms in Africa requires an understanding of what 
kinds of capital move, in what sectors, and how they adapt to what political and economic 
contexts. This section uses evidence from selected case studies to show how variations in 
labour regimes in Chinese enterprises in Africa contribute to some of the outcomes discussed 
in the previous section.
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 Evidence on Chinese firms in Africa points to a variety of patterns 
depending on countries. In most countries, we find SOEs in construction, small and medium-
sized firms in light industry and building materials sectors, a mix of SOEs and private firms 
in extractive sectors (mining and oil), and small firms in services (Shen, 2015; McKinsey, 
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 The evidence selected for this section comes primarily from high-quality ethnographic research on Chinese 
firms in mining and construction in Zambia (Lee, 2017), longitudinal qualitative evidence on labour practices in 
Angola (Tang, 2010, 2016) and recent comparative qualitative research in construction and manufacturing in 
Angola and Ethiopia from a SOAS project in progress (https://www.soas.ac.uk/idcea/ ).  
2017; Wolf and Cheng, 2018). Labour processes and regimes differ a lot between these 
sectors and across firm types, particularly between construction and mining, and between 
construction and manufacturing. Our own research in Angola and Ethiopia also points to 
important differences within same sectors and types of firms, driven by the national political 
economy context, particularly labour market structures, labour supply dynamics, government 
policy, and local labour institutions. In sum, variation in labour practices as illustrated in this 
section confirms the need to analyze labour outcomes in Chinese firms as the result of 
complex interactions between the three levels proposed under our labour regime analysis 
(Figure 13.1). 
Lee (2017) produces unusual longitudinal comparative ethnographic research on 
accumulation regimes and labour outcomes in Zambia, in mining and construction, two 
sectors where the presence of Chinese firms is significant alongside other foreign companies. 
Lee grounds her theoretically informed work in the direct experiences of workers, managers, 
policy makers, and politicians, reflecting fluid encounters that defy generalizations, while 
suggesting some analytically relevant patterns. Thus a distinction is made between varieties 
of capital (i.e., different types of Chinese capital) to overcome the trap of ―methodological 
nationalism‖ or ―national institutionalism‖ inherent in a ‗varieties of capitalism‘ approach 
(Ibid.: 9). The combination of systemic forces (inherent accumulation logic of capital, 
competition imperatives, etc.) and contingent events (1970s and 2008 crises, technological 
breakthroughs, ‗going out‘ of Chinese enterprises) produces outcomes that cannot be simply 
deducted from some form of historical determinism. Chinese state capital (SOEs), for 
example, ―at home and abroad, is Janus faced, both centrally controlled and also capable of 
decentralized and local improvisation‖ (Ibid.: 10). Therefore, Lee shows that in order to 
explain labour outcomes in Chinese mines and construction sites in Zambia, it is critical to 
understand the dual logic of Chinese state capital (accumulation for profit, and securing 
resources and political/diplomatic influence) compared with the single-minded profit-driven 
logic of private capital, whether Chinese, other foreign, or domestic. Historical and country 
contextualization is also essential as all ‗capitals‘ faced a common labour law regime that has 
been liberalized after decades of structural adjustment and deregulation in Zambia. Through 
this nuanced empirical immersion, Lee reveals contradictory labour outcomes in mining, 
whereby Chinese state capital workplaces are characterized by stable but low-wage 
employment, whereas private TNCs may display seemingly less exploitative practices in a 
more flexible labour regime where retrenchment is the immediate response to market 
volatility, as experienced in the 2008–09 crisis. This research also shows the importance of 
sector specificities and particularly the exploitative features of construction labour regimes, 
whether in China, Zambia, or Europe, in contrast with the tradition of labour militancy and 
important political effects of the copper mining sector. Lee (2017: 29) argues that ―the 
footloose and project-based nature of construction undermines the collective capacity of 
construction labour in its struggle with capital, whether state or private‖. Finally, at the 
analytical level of the national political economy, the Zambian context suggests that ―politics 
- and, more precisely, a political synergy between state and society- not bureaucracy or 
technocracy … is the key to leveraging Chinese state capital for development‖ (Lee 2017: 
158).  
Ongoing SOAS comparative research on Angola and Ethiopia also places emphasis on the 
politics of production at the national political economic level. In Angola the imperative of 
rapid post-war infrastructure reconstruction in the period 2005–15 and the political 
expediency of Chinese-financed and -built projects meant much less attention to job creation 
and local linkages, an omission partly exacerbated by a weak and resource-poor trade union 
system. The lack of voice from civil society and the absence of electoral contestation to the 
ruling party MPLA left priorities in the hands of the narrow Angolan political elite. By 
contrast, in Ethiopia, the imperative of structural transformation was linked to rapid job 
creation so workforce localization was far more important and politically important. Indeed, 
the promises of industrialization and rapid job creation have also generated expectations that 
shape the politics of production in the country, paradoxically leading to more labour 
militancy alongside protests around the appropriation of development outcomes. There are 
implications for labour outcomes, either in terms of different rates of workforce localization 
for SOEs, or in terms of the attraction of labour practices from globally integrated 
manufacturing production in Ethiopia compared to more informalized labour relations in 
factories oriented to the Angolan domestic market. These differences also entail different 
paths towards structural transformation and the building of an industrial workforce more 
dynamic in Ethiopia than in Angola. 
SOAS comparative research in these two countries also reminds us of the context specificity 
of sectors, which makes the ―methodological nationalism‖ of comparisons between firms of 
different nationality questionable. Lee (2017: 156) illustrates how different varieties of 
capital, Chinese state or global private, may in certain sectors adopt labour regimes that share 
international and industry-wide tendencies. While it is true that informalized and casualized 
labour is a central tendency in construction labour practices across countries, the preliminary 
findings of SOAS research suggest that the national context is crucial to understand 
differences in labour outcomes even for the same varieties of capital. Chinese SOEs are 
present in both Angola and Ethiopia but they adapt their labour practices to the labour market 
context they find, whether a as function of labour legislation and its enforcement (more 
liberal and less enforced in Angola) or in relation to the relative scarcity of skills in the two 
countries. In both countries, all forms of capital (state or private) in the construction sector 
find it hard to adopt the cascade subcontracting practices found in China and other countries 
with ‗thick‘ construction business networks, and are forced to engage in direct employment 
and processes of recruitment and retention as in the manufacturing sector. Labour 
intermediaries are therefore absent, especially in Angola, so employers and employment 
relations are explicitly recognized, even if this does not necessarily translate into better 
working conditions in terms of wages, security, and benefits, given the weakness of labour 
legislation and associated institutions. 
Various authors also pay attention to the particularities of management ethos in different 
varieties of Chinese capital across different sectors (Lee, 2017, Tang, 2016, Sun, 2017). Lee 
(2017: 13) does refer to the particular management ethos present in Chinese state capital 
characterized by ―eating bitterness‖ and a form of ―collective asceticism‖ that contrasts with 
the dynamic individual careerism of managers in global private capital. Tang (2016) also 
suggests that language barriers, lack of communication, and a tendency towards isolation 
from local host society create perceptions that affect labour encounters and fuel negative 
perceptions. Perhaps the main aspect of labour encounters between Africa and China that 
may result from ‗Chinese characteristics‘ is language barriers and communication problems, 
which may exacerbate some of the work culture clashes and contradictory expectations 
common to all varieties of capital within and across sectors.
14
 Chinese managers and firms do 
adapt though, after long periods of observation and interaction, thus gradually overcoming 
initial barriers. Notwithstanding these differences, there is a risk of describing these 
differences and ‗clashes‘ as static attributes of culture, as there are also important similarities 
across different national boundaries. It is possible to speak of management ethos that is 
specific to certain sectors or production regimes, rather than nations/cultures, for example, a 
disciplinary and time-efficiency oriented ethos in labour-intensive garment factories, with 
work culture clashes that happen between African workers newly arrived to a low-wage 
factory labour regime and foreign factory managers often coming from China, India, 
                                                 
14
 Tang (2016) provides ample evidence of these barriers affecting labour conflicts and the effectiveness of 
training and labour management more generally in several African countries.  
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka (in the case of Ethiopia). Many of the negative perceptions about 
workers‘ qualities and employers‘ behaviour essentially reflect the fact that ―factory owners 
have always complained about their workers during early phases of industrialization and 
Chinese bosses in Africa are no exception‖ (Sun, 2017: 99). Many authors have given 
examples of negative representations of workers in the early phases of industrialization in 
today‘s industrial giants: Germany, Japan, and China (Oya, 2019; Chang, 2008). 
Management ethos and associated labour practices also depend on some structural factors and 
strategic decisions, such as between labour-intensive and capital-intensive production, and 
between international customers (exporting to global markets) and domestic markets (Sun, 
2017: 52–5).  
Chinese exceptionalism? African agency and context 
This chapter explores the labour implications of the rise of Chinese FDI and building 
contractors in Africa, and their encounters with workers, states, and unions in African 
countries. A selective survey of the available literature on labour practices in Chinese firms in 
Africa shows the widespread negative perceptions of exploitative management despite very 
limited systematic and comparative evidence. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence on rates 
of localization (or the extent to which these firms rely on imported Chinese labour), poor 
working conditions, and limited skill development, but emerging scholarly research paints a 
more nuanced picture of labour outcomes, and much greater variation than usually 
recognized. There is urgent need for more systematic, comparative, and larger-scale mixed-
methods evidence to assess the extent to which Chinese firms adopt labour regimes that are 
similar to those found in China and how they adapt to new national political economy and 
labour market contexts as they travel. The chapter proposes different sets of questions 
grounded in a labour regime framework to understand the variety of labour regimes found in 
China and the shifting trends of the past two decades. This analysis suggests that labour 
practices and outcomes are fluid and that the ‗methodological nationalism‘ inherent in 
emphasizing labour ‗Chinese characteristics‘ is misplaced. Through illustrations from more 
recent case-study evidence of labour encounters in different African countries, this chapter 
stresses that, in order to make sense of the multiplicity of outcomes in labour relations in 
Chinese enterprises in Africa (and elsewhere) it is crucial to understand and document: (a) the 
diversity of ‗Chinese capitals‘; (b) the importance of African labour market contexts and their 
current historical conjuncture; (c) the dynamics of state–society and state–capital relations in 
each country; and (d) the particularities and structural features of different sectors and 
production regimes in which Chinese firms are investing and operating. More rigorous 
evidence on these dimensions is necessary to extract policy-relevant lessons, so that African 
countries and their governments can act to maximize the positive employment effects of the 
rise of Chinese actors in Africa. Indeed, the chapter has shown that the process of job creation 
and the quality of jobs can be substantially influenced by policy in host countries in the form 
of ‗sticks‘ and ‗carrots‘ that can enforce and induce better labour standards. Only more 
rigorous comparative approaches to these questions and constructive suggestions for policy 
will help us overcome some of the myths that have marred our understanding of the subject 
until now. 
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Appendix Table A1: Estimated employment localization rates in Chinese firms in Africa from most significant studies/cases 








Akorsu and Cooke (2011) 2009 Ghana manufacturing GUMCO 250 3 99% 
Baah and Jauch (2009) 2008 South Africa manufacturing FIDA, IINCOOL, KaRITA (all clothing) 958 27 97% 
CARI-SAIS (Survey by Chinese 
official) 
2011 Rwanda construction China Road & Bridge Corp. (Road building) 2,000 110 95% 
Lee (2017) 2007 Zambia  mining Chambishi copper mine 2,063 189 92% 
Chen et al. (2016) 2018 Nigeria manufacturing 16 Chinese firms (cumulative number of workers) 5,656 540 91% 
Warmerdam and Dijk (2013) 2012 Uganda various 42 companies in Kampala 9,845 1,004 91% 




Survey of 69 Chinese firms 23,723 2,728 90% 
CARI-SAIS (Reuters) 2011 Zimbabwe mining Anjin: Joint venture diamond mining 1,700 210 89% 
McKinsey report (2017) 2016–17 8 countries various Survey of over 1,000 companies 300,000 37,079 89% 
Brautigam and Tang (2012) 2011 4 countries manufacturing Firms in 4 Special Economic Zones 13,592 1,979 87% 
CARI-SAIS (Hans E. Petersen and 
Sanne van der Lugt's report) 
2011 DRC construction 
DRC Reconstruction of Lubumbashi (N1) – 
Kasenga (Zambian Border) Road Reconstruction 
600 100 86% 
Sautman and Yan (2015) 2007–13 12 countries various Surveys and reports for over 400 firms/projects N/A N/A 85% 
CARI-SAIS (China Africa Business 
Council) 
2013 Africa various 193 Chinese companies in Africa 34,000 6,400 84% 
Baah and Jauch (2009) 2008 Ghana construction Bui hydroelectric dam (Sino Hydro) 560 110 84% 
Huang (2013) 2012 S. Africa various 16 companies 4,160 779 84% 
Baah and Jauch (2009) 2008 Angola construction Sinohydro 715 312 70% 
CARI-SAIS (The Africa Report) 2010 Mozambique construction Mozambique stadium 1,000 500 67% 
Tang (2010) 2007 Angola various 55 companies 5,482 3,353 62% 
CARI-SAIS (Enrique Martino reports) 2013 Equ. Guinea construction China Road and Bridges 60 600 10% 
Source: Author‘s elaboration based on sources reported in first column; CARI-SAIS sources are available from their database at http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-workers-in-
africa   
 
